ArticlesstatesmenPublicationsO.Historylinksforeign policy studiesAyam Monthly Review
Home Page » Articles » Nationalization of Iran Oil industry and English Conspirators in Khuzestan
Keywords :
All words
Each word

the foundation of political philosophy in Iran-constitutional period

The foundation of political philosophy in Iran-constitutional period


Iranian Contemporary History No. 60


History Hall


  Nationalization of Iran Oil industry and English Conspirators in Khuzestan 
Ali Akbar KhedriZadeh
Simultaneously, with the approval of the planning of the Iran Oil industry's nationalization by Senate and National Consultative Assembly, an English and Iran oil company refused to pay 30 percent of the workers' wages of Mashour port and other ports such as Aqa jari, Lali and white oil. Therefore, the workers stroke and the government announced martial law in Khuzestan. The government sent a number of military forces from Ahvaz, Isfahan and Khoram Abad to the areas and they could reduce the strike, but the oil company did not accept the strikers' requests. On March 27, 1951, the English government declared that it has sent the Flamingo and Ilogous ships to Abadan to protect the Britain industries in in the areas. The two warships constituted some parts of Britain naval forces in the Persian Gulf and their station located in Bahrain. Shepard who was the Britain Ambassador in Tehran, asked a question the Prime Minister, Hussein Ala, what he has done in the oil- rich provinces for supporting the English people. On March 29, 1951, the military forces attacked on people in Abadan and killed 3 persons. The next day, nearly thousands of oil pipeline workers joint to the strikers. The next week, the situation was quieted down and till April 7, the one third of strikers returned to work. But on April 12, the Mashour and Abadan port workers revolted and it leaded to kill and injury some of the oil company's workers.
Afterwards, the third Britain warship (Vern) entered the Persian Gulf and the Yoyalous warship moved from Mediterranean to join Gambia. The Britain ambassador met Hussein Ala for the second time, and he negotiated with him about his government actions. On April 16, 1951, Ayatollah Seyyed Abu al- Qasem Kashani issued a statement and asked the company's workers to end the revolution. He also ensured the workers that the Britain would leave Iran so soon and Iran government would compensate the damages.
Moreover, Doctor Mossadeq stated his opposition about martial law declaration in Khuzestan in the National Consultative Assembly on July 16 and the National Front representatives refused to vote to the government's proposal based on the national law declaration and the government acclaimed it without any investigation about the strike. Then, Mossadeq quoted the National Front declaration for the workers and told them to quit the strike and returned to work. Thereafter, some of strike leaders were arrested and the rebellion was suppressed and till May 2, 1952, Abadan was the only region where the insurgency was continued but gradually, some of the workers backed to work. On this day, Sepahbod Shah Bakhti (the dispatched military commander from Tehran) sent a telegram from the sixth province (Khuzestan) to Ala Mokhbereh and told the strike is still continuing in Abadan but, 37500 workers backed to the work by actions and today four main strike's agents arrested, these people were: Kervalian, Zavari, Aqa Dashi and Keyhan Panah.
Although the strike of the oil company's workers ended by the government attempts, the Britain government always plotted and stimulated the oil company's staff and on May 8, 1951, Sepahbod Shah Bakhti ( the dispatched military commander from Tehran) sent a telegraph to Mossadeq, the Prime Minister, from the sixth province (Khuzestan):" According to the high- ranking staff statement of the oil company based on their worrying about probable unemployment during the oil Nationalization Law enforcement, in fact, These rumors is said by the oil company's foreign employees.

Send Feedback

Contact us : (9821+) 2260 4037-38 -

Copyright © 2012 IICHS. All Rights Reserved
The opinions expressed by contributors pertain solely to them and do not represent the views of IICHS
The reproduction of articles is free by announcing the resource
The best viewed: IE8 or higher version